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INTRODUCTION 
Tribes have a tremendous amount of groundwater rights that have 
yet to be quantified under the doctrine of federal reserved water rights.1 
Asserting tribal water rights may not have been necessary in the past, 
but now as populations surge in the West, tribes may need to protect 
their reservations, and any potential rights, from problematic state 
water practices.2 
State water users, particularly in the arid West, are increasingly 
relying on aquifers to supplement the use of surface water during dry 
periods.3 Over-allocated water systems, along with sustained droughts 
have put additional pressure on groundwater resources.4 Over-pumping 
aquifers can often lead to deteriorated water quality from saltwater 
intrusion into aquifers,5 and recharging aquifers with surface water can 
lead to impaired drinking water quality or damage to salt-sensitive 
 
1 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 19.01[1], at 1204 (Nell Jessup 
Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]; see also Stephen V. Quesenberry et 
al., Tribal Strategies for Protecting and Preserving Groundwater, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 431, 434 (2015) [hereinafter Quesenberry] (describing unquantified tribal water rights 
to groundwater in California). 
2 See Quesenberry, supra note 1, at 436. See also Jonathan M. Hanna, Native 
Communities and Climate Change: Legal and Policy Approaches to Protect Tribal Legal 
Rights, 1 (U. of Colo. Nat. Res. L. Cir. 2007); David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of 
Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States’ Role?, 
20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 60−65 (2001); Judith V. Royster, Indian Tribal Rights to 
Groundwater, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 489 (2006) (some tribes depend entirely on 
groundwater for their water source). 
3 Groundwater in the United States accounts for roughly one-fifth of the total water 
supply, including water used in agriculture, domestic use, mining, and industry. Joan F. 
Kenny et al., Estimated Use of Water in the United States 2005. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 
CIRCULAR 1344 (2009); see also Benjamin R. Vance, Total Aquifer Management: A New 
Approach to Groundwater Protection, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 803 (1996); Jay R. Lund & Thomas 
Harter, California’s groundwater problems and prospects, CALIFORNIA WATER BLOG, 
(Jan. 01, 2013), http://californiawaterblog.com/2013/01/30/californias-groundwater-prob 
lems-and-prospects/ (discussing California); Allison Evans, The Groundwater/Surface 
Water Dilemma in Arizona: A Look Back and a Look Ahead Toward Conjunctive 
Management Reform, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 269 (2010) (discussing Arizona); CLIMATE 
CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: WATER RESOURCES 76−78, available at 
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/downloads (describing the effects of climate change on 
groundwater availability across the United States). 
4 See supra text and accompanying footnotes at note 3. 
5 Vance, supra note 3, at 804−05, 808−09 (describing the process of over-drafting 
aquifers and the resulting groundwater crises; see also Allison Mylander Gregory 11 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 229 1992 Groundwater and Its Future Use: Competing Interests and 
Burgeoning Markets; Lund & Harter, supra note 3 (addressing groundwater problems in 
California). 
GIBSON (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2016  2:22 PM 
2016] Solid Grounds for Tribal Groundwater: 271 
A Look at Implied Rights to Groundwater Quality 
crops.6 This can carry attendant cost to desalinate water—a potentially 
high bill to pay.7 The problem is, most states do not have robust 
regulations to protect groundwater resources much less groundwater 
quality, and such types of protections are outside of the scope of federal 
regulations.8 
However, some tribes may not be at the mercy of inadequate state 
water codes if they have federally reserved water rights, as the article 
will argue. Tribes with such rights may be in the unique position to 
protect groundwater resources and enjoin state water practices that 
impair groundwater quality. 
Protecting groundwater quality rests on cases that have developed 
the doctrine of federal reserved water rights. (Part I). In essence, the 
doctrine recognizes the power of the United States to impliedly reserve 
the amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of a federal 
reservation of land and exempt the water from state appropriation and 
law.9 However, courts must remember that the doctrine originated in 
the context of water rights for Indian reservations and, as such, carries 
distinct canons of construction when interpreting treaties to determine 
the purpose of an Indian reservation. (Part II). 
As this Article argues, the purpose of an Indian reservation should 
be a permanent home for a tribes, which includes both present and 
future needs of the tribe to make the land livable and valuable. (Part 
III). Groundwater quality, by this extension, is an anticipated aspect of 
the quantity necessary to support a permanent, livable and valuable 
homeland, irrespective of state sovereignty interests, like controlling 
water resources and practices within the state. (Conclusion). 
  
 
6 2 Waters and Water Rights § 18.06 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3rd. LexisNexis/Mathew 
Bender 2015); James M. Grijalva, Where Are the Tribal Water Quality Standards and 
TMDLs?, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 63 (2004). 
7 See, e.g., United States v. Gila Valley River District (Gila II), 920 F. Supp. 1444, 
1447−48 (D. Ariz 1994) aff’d 117 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1997). 
8 See RODGERS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2 ENVTL. L. (West) § 4:17 Water quality 
standards—State law (judicial review) (2013) [hereinafter RODGERS]. States often point to 
their water codes when defending adequate protection of groundwater. See In re General 
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River (Gila III), 989 P.2d 739, 747−49 
(Ariz. 1999). Federal statutes that govern water quality, like the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251−1387, 86 Stat. 816 (1972), and the Safe Water Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f, 88 
Stat. 1660 (1974), are silent on the matter of saltwater intrusion. 
9 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
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I 
DEFINING THE CONTOURS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVED WATER 
RIGHTS DOCTRINE 
While there is no controlling authority that expressly acknowledges 
a tribe’s right to groundwater of a certain quality, the doctrine of federal 
reserved water rights does not preclude such a claim. In order to 
understand the claim’s logic, it is important to first understand the basic 
tenants of the doctrine and the origin of the doctrine in Winters v. 
United States. Second, it is equally as important to untangle case 
precedent following Winters that has confused two branches of the 
doctrine as it applies to Indian reservations—so called “Winters 
rights”—and other federal reservations of land. 
A. Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine 
The federal reserved water rights doctrine holds that when the 
federal government reserves land, it also impliedly reserves an amount 
of water necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation of 
land.10 The federal water right receives a priority date that attaches to 
the date of the reservation of land.11 This essentially means in times of 
water shortage, if a federal water right is “older” than a state water 
right, the federal water right must be satisfied first. Stated in other 
words, a junior state water right may not harm a senior federal water 
right by diminishing the quantity or quality of the water.12 
The federal reserved water rights doctrine also carves out a special 
exception from state water practices. While the allocation of water 
resources is typically the purview of the states, the doctrine recognizes 
the federal government’s power to reserve water and exempt that 
amount from state appropriation and law.13 Therefore, federal water 
rights are governed by federal law not state law.14 For example, a state 
 
10 Winters, 207 U.S. at 576; Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138, 141 (1976); 
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963). 
11 The priority date for Indian reservations can vary and depends on whether the federal 
government reserved the water for uses or purposes that existed prior to the establishment 
of the reservation. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 19.03[3], at 1215. 
12 Winters, 207 U.S. at 567; COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 19.03[9]. 
13 Winters, 207 U.S. at 577 (“The power of the government to reserve the waters and 
exempt them from appropriation under state laws is not denied, and could not be.”) (citing 
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 702 (1899); United States v. 
Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905)). 
14 See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 714 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 
426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976); Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 
U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (“the volume and scope of particular reserved rights . . . [remain] 
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water law that deems water to be abandoned after a period of nonuse 
would have no effect on a federal reserved water right that has never 
been used.15 
The doctrine of federal reserved water rights now includes all types 
of federal reservations of land, including Indian reservations and lands 
reserved for public use, like national forests and national monuments.16 
However, as the doctrine has evolved some courts have failed to 
recognize the legal distinctions between Indian reservations and non-
Indian reservations.17 
Courts that apply non-Indian case precedent to determine Indian 
reserved water rights, fail to remember that treaties, as an agreement 
with sovereign nations, are distinct from Congressional acts that 
reserve land for public use. Forgetting this distinction is to the 
detriment of tribes, as non-Indian case precedent can drastically reduce 
the scope of water rights for Indian reservations.18 This practice of 
blurring the treatment of federal reservations must stop, as it is not true 
to the underlying principles of the federal reserved water rights 
doctrine. Courts should be reminded of the doctrine’s origin in Winters 
v. United States, and the underlying, and distinct, principles that the 
Winters Court used to find an implied reservation of water for an Indian 
reservation. 
B. Winters Rights 
In Winters v. United States,19 the Supreme Court first considered 
impliedly reserved federal rights to water. The federal government 
sought to enjoin state water appropriators in Montana from diverting 
the Milk River near the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation.20 Congress 
 
federal questions”) (quoting United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 
526 (1971)). 
15 See, e.g., United States v. City & Cty. of Denver, By & Through Bd. of Water 
Comm’rs, 656 P.2d 1, 34 (Colo. 1982) (“Federal reserved water rights are immune from 
Colorado’s non-use requirement to the extent necessary to fulfill the purposes of the 
reservation.”). 
16 Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601 (1963) (recognizing national parks); United States v. New 
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (deciding reserved rights for a national forest system); 
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (extending reserved rights to a national 
monument). 
17 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 19.03[4], at 1217. 
18 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 19.03[4], at 1217. 
19 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
20 Id. at 565. 
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established the reservation as part of an agreement with several Indian 
tribes21 in 1888, just one year prior to granting Montana statehood.22 
As was federal policy at the time, the nomadic tribes agreed to cede 
large tracts of land to the United States in order to establish more 
permanent homes and become an agrarian people.23 However, the 
smaller tract of land that became the reservation was arid and no longer 
included the Milk River.24 Without irrigation, the land was “practically 
valueless.”25 
State water users argued that all water in the Milk River was subject 
to state appropriation for two reasons. First, when the tribes ceded their 
land, they also impliedly ceded their right to irrigate the Reservation 
from the Milk River.26 Second, even if the United States had impliedly 
reserved water for the tribes, that right was effectively repealed when 
the federal government granted Montana statehood and the State 
received title to all navigable waters.27 The Court found both 
assumptions untenable.28 
The Court quickly dispensed with the argument that statehood wiped 
out existing federal water rights. It concluded that the federal 
government had the undeniable power to reserve water necessary for 
the purpose of a federal reservation of land, thus exempting that amount 
from state appropriation and law.29 Even though such a ruling could 
have negative consequences to state title to water, the Court reasoned 
it was more dangerous to assume30 that the United States in granting 
 
21 The reservation included the Gros Ventre, Piegan, Blood, Blackfeet, and River Crow 
Indians. Id. at 567. 
22 Id. at 575, 577. 
23 Id. at 577. For a description of the federal policy at the time of allotment, see COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.04, at 71−74. 
24 Winters, 207 U.S. at 576. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 577. This argument rests on the equal footing doctrine argument. For more on 
how the equal footing doctrine has affected state appropriation systems, see Amy Choyce 
Allison, Extending Winters to Water Quality: Allowing Groundwater for Hatcheries, 77 
WASH. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (2002). 
28 Winters, 207 U.S. at 577. 
29 Id. (“The power of the government to reserve the waters and exempt them from 
appropriation under state laws is not denied, and could not be.”) (citing United States v. Rio 
Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 702 (1899); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 
(1905)). 
30 The Winters Court recognized that there were competing inferences that must be made, 
but “that which makes for the retention of the waters is of greater force than that which 
makes for their cession.” Id. at 576. 
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Montana statehood had simultaneously taken from the Indian tribes the 
means of continuing their old nomadic practices but yet did not leave 
them the “power to change” to new ones.31 Sensitivity to the State’s 
interest in water did not move the Court to hold otherwise.32 
The Court further refused to assume that the Indian tribes had given 
up their rights to water merely because the agreement did not expressly 
provide for that right.33 Ambiguities in agreements with tribes are to be 
resolved from the standpoint of the Indians, reminded the Court.34 This 
canon of construction “should certainly be applied to determine 
between two inferences, one of which would support the purpose of the 
agreement and the other impair or defeat it.”35 Ultimately, the Court 
concluded that the United States had intended to reserve the amount of 
water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation.36 
The Court left undisturbed the Ninth Circuit opinion, from which the 
case was certified, that the purpose of the reservation was to establish 
a “permanent home and abiding place.”37 While the purpose of the 
reservation was not at issue, the Court referred to the treaty and the 
underlying agreement as providing the tribes the “power to change” to 
a “pastoral and civilized people” and make the land valuable for such 
a civilized society.38 
While the Court’s primary holding is clear—that the federal 
government has the power to impliedly reserve an amount of water 
necessary to fulfil the purpose of the reservation—the underlying 
principles are also important in the context of Indian reservations. 
Namely that (a) ambiguities in treaties should be resolved in favor of 
tribes as they would have understood the agreement; (b) the underlying 
 
31 Id. at 576−77 (“The Indians had command of the lands and the waters,—command of 
all their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, and grazing roving herds of stock, or turned 
to agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this? Did they reduce the area 
of their occupation and give up the waters which made it valuable or adequate?”). 
32 Id. at 576. 
33 Id. at 576−77. 
34 Id. at 576. 
35 Id. at 577. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 566−67; Winters v. United States 143 F. 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1906) (“In order to 
obtain the means and enable them to become self-supporting, as a pastoral and agricultural 
people, and to educate their children in the paths of civilization, the agreements were entered 
into. It was for that purpose, and other reasons mentioned in the different articles of the 
treaty, that the Indians ceded and relinquished to the United States all their right, title and 
interest in and to all the lands.”). 
38 Winters, 207 U.S. at 576, 577. 
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purpose of an Indian reservation is a to create a valuable, habitable 
homeland; and (c) sensitivity to state water users is not a limiting factor 
on the scope of the water right if it defeats the purpose of the 
reservation.39 These principles are important to keep in mind as the 
federal reserved water rights doctrine evolved in both Indian and non-
Indian contexts following Winters. 
C. The Winters Principles Left Behind 
While courts have uniformly upheld “Winters rights” for Indian 
reservations, there appears to be more discordance in the law than 
ever.40 Courts vary wildly when determining the scope and extent of 
Winters rights, which is tied to the purpose of a reservation.41 Some 
courts broadly construe the purpose of an Indian reservation and award 
an amount of water necessary for the needs of the tribe as a 
“homeland.” Other courts narrowly construe the purpose and award 
only the amount of water necessary for the “very purpose” of the Indian 
reservation, often found to be agriculture. Part III discusses these 
discordant approaches in further detail. 
The discordance in the law seems to come from the doctrine’s 
evolution in the context of non-Indian reservations. Courts that have 
extended Winters rights to non-Indian federal reservations of public 
land like national forests have found it necessary to reign in the extent 
of the water rights, so as to be sensitive the realities of water-needy 
states.42 Other courts have relied on this non-Indian case precedent to 
also limit an award for Indian reservations.43 
These courts fail to note that federal reservations of land for public 
use is distinct from land set aside for tribes. In so doing, in the context 
of Indian reservations, these courts neglect to acknowledge the 
underlying principles of Winters that supported the original opinion in 
the first place: tribes have expectations at the time of a treaty, and an 
implied reservation of water helps make a land valuable and habitable 
 
39 Id. at 576−77. 
40 See Judith V. Royster, A Primer on Indian Water Rights: More Questions Than 
Answers, 30 TULSA L.J. 61 (1994). 
41 Compare In re Gila River Sys. & Source (Gila III), 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999) with In 
re Big Horn River Sys. (Big Horn), 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988). 
42 See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 131, 138 (1976) (national monument); 
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 596 (1963) (Indian reservations, national forests, 
national recreation areas, and national wildlife refuges). 
43 In re Big Horn River Sys. (Big Horn), 753 P.2d 76, 100 (Wyo. 1988) (limiting a federal 
reserved water right for an Indian reservation to irrigation purposes). 
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for tribes; states interests are not a factor.44 To forget these principles 
has the effect of equating Indian reservations, where a nation of people 
live, to reservations of public land for public uses. 
II 
DETERMINING THE EXTENT OF WINTERS RIGHTS IN SURFACE 
WATER 
In order to recognize that Winters rights include a right to water 
unimpaired in quality, courts must distinguish between Indian and non-
Indian reservations.45 These two types of federal reservations of land 
carry corresponding principles that guide a determination of the 
reservation’s purpose, and, therefore, the potential extent of that right.46 
One is narrow and limits the amount of water to merely what is 
necessary to fulfill the “very purpose” of the reservation.47 The other is 
more expansive and only applies in the context of Indian water rights; 
that approach awards an amount of water necessary to fulfill a 
“homeland purpose.”48 
The courts that have carelessly cross-pollinated opinions from non-
Indian contexts to Indian contexts have needlessly diminished water 
rights for Indian reservations.49 The “very purpose” approach, which 
arose in a federal public land context, has had the effect of some courts 
narrowing the purpose of an Indian reservation to the very purpose of 
agriculture and will not include other possible purposes such as 
commercial or domestic needs.50 However, Indian reservations should 
be afforded a more liberal interpretation of purpose than that of other 
federal lands. 
The following sections describe (1) the sentiment behind the “very 
purpose” analysis as originating in the context of a national forest and 
a water-strapped state; (2) the detrimental effect on Winters rights when 
courts have applied the “very purpose” analysis to Indian reservations; 
 
44 See supra text accompanying notes 28−31. 
45 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 19.03[4], at 1217. 
46 See, e.g., Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 94. 
47 See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); United States v. New 
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). 
48 See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton (Walton II), 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 
1981), rev’d on other grounds 752 F.2d 397, 405 (9th Cir. 1985). 
49 See, e.g., United States v. Washington (Lummi), 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (W.D. Wash. 
2005); Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76. 
50 See, e.g., id. at 96−99; Lummi, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 1065. 
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(3) and finally, why courts can and should only apply a homeland 
purpose to Indian reservations to determine the extent of a Winters 
right. 
A. The Very Purpose of Non-Indian Reservations 
The Supreme Court in United States v. New Mexico,51 issued the last 
Court decision on federal reserved water rights doctrine and a placed 
serious constraint on the doctrine’s potential reach. The New Mexico 
Court limited the amount of water impliedly reserved for Gila National 
Forest to only the amount necessary to satisfy the “very purpose” of the 
forest, which the Court determined to be for harvesting timber.52 The 
United States argued the purpose of the national forest system also 
included aesthetic, recreational, and fish-preservation purposes; 
therefore, it had intended to reserve minimum instream flows to fulfill 
those purposes.53 The Court disagreed, and found that those purposes 
were “secondary.”54 Such secondary purposes, determined the Court, 
did not comport with the sensitivity Congress had toward “water-needy 
states and private appropriators” when setting aside public lands.55 
In recognition of Congress’s sensitivity to a state’s water needs, the 
Court thereby limited the possible water right to only the amount 
necessary so as not to “entirely defeat” the forest’s primary purpose of 
providing timber.56 Water necessary for the secondary purposes of 
aesthetic, recreational, and fish-preservation purposes, would be 
subject to state law as any other appropriator.57 
The holding in New Mexico appears to be a heavy-handed constraint 
on the growth of federal reserved water rights doctrine and, by 
implication, on Winters rights. As Justice Brennan’s dissent noted, the 
opinion has a one-dimensional understanding of a forest by not 
 
51 438 U.S. 696, 696 (1978). 
52 Id. at 706−08 (interpreting an 1897 act establishing the national forest system for the 
purpose of protecting the forests, and furnishing “a continuous supply of timber”). 
53 Id. at 705. 
54 Id. at 701−02. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 701−02 (quoting Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976) (internal 
citations omitted). 
57 Id. (“Where water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, however, 
there arises the contrary inference that Congress intended, consistent with its other views, 
that the United States would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private 
appropriator.”). 
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awarding water necessary to sustain a forest’s viability.58 If the Court 
can apply such a view to a forest’s viability, even if the forest is used 
just for timber, what is to stop the Court from applying such a narrow 
view to the viability of Indian reservations as well? 
With this very real possibility in mind, a court determining water 
rights for Indian reservations is not bound to the New Mexico holding 
as the decision should be read in context. Most notably, the Court’s 
supporting cases do not purport to limit the purpose of Indian 
reservations.59 If anything, the supporting cases limit only non-Indian 
reservations, such as federal enclaves and national monuments.60 The 
supporting case that involved Indian reservations, established an 
implied reservation of water for Indian reservations without referring 
to the purpose at all.61 
Moreover, recognizing Congress’s sensitivity to “water-needy” 
states may make sense for acts creating federal public lands, but not for 
treaties with tribal nations. Congress created Indian reservations often 
by ratifying treaties as agreements with tribes to cede tribal rights in 
exchange for peace and a permanent home.62 The states generally had 
no role in treaties.63 And, as Winters established, the separate interests 
of state sovereigns in water are not to be a consideration when courts 
interpret treaties.64 
Finally, and of fundamental importance, while reservations of land 
for Indian tribes are at the exclusion of non-Indians,65 reservations of 
 
58 See id. at 719. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The forests consist of the birds, animals, and 
fish—the wildlife—that inhabit them, as well as the trees, flowers, shrubs, and grasses. I 
therefore would hold that the United States is entitled to so much water as is necessary to 
sustain the wildlife of the forests, as well as the plants.”). 
59 Two cases interpret the purpose of non-Indian federal reservations: Cappaert, 426 U.S. 
128 (finding Winters rights for a national monument); United States v. Dist. Court for Eagle 
County, 401 U.S. 520, 522−23 (1971) (recognizing federal reserved water rights in federal 
enclaves). 
60 See supra note 51, at 719. 
61 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598−99 (1963) (“it is impossible to believe that 
when Congress enacted the great Colorado Indian Reservation . . . they were unaware that 
most of the lands were of the desert kind—hot, scorching sands—and the water would be 
essential to life of the Indian people and the animals they hunted and the crops they raised”). 
62 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.03[1], at 23−27. Historically, congressional 
ratification of a treaty was the primary mechanism for establishing an Indian reservation. 
See id. at § 1.03[1]. 
63 Id. 
64 See id. at § 1.03[1]. 
65 Id. 
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public land are for the inclusion of all. To conflate the two 
“reservations” reduces the livelihood of sovereign nations to that of 
sustaining timber in a national forest. 
B. The Very Purpose as Applied to Indian Reservations 
Even though some jurists have acknowledged a distinction between 
Indian and non-Indian reservations in the federal reserved water rights 
doctrine,66 the holding in New Mexico has found its way into 
determinations of Winters rights, further confusing the doctrine as 
applied to Indian reservations.67 
Courts following the New Mexico guideline tailor the scope of Indian 
reserved water rights to primary purposes—usually to agricultural 
purposes.68 In fact, courts have awarded a reserved right tied to an 
agrarian purpose in virtually every litigation of water rights.69 Other 
purposes of a reservation, such as municipal or commercial purposes, 
are often secondary purposes subject to state appropriation laws.70 The 
laser focus of this primary/secondary distinction often results in a 
diminished possible amount for a Winters right and subjects necessary 
“secondary” purposes to state law. 
In United States v. Adair the Ninth Circuit recognized water rights 
for the Klamath Indian Reservation for the primary purpose of hunting, 
fishing, and gathering.71 In so finding, the court stated that “water rights 
may be implied only ‘where water is necessary to fulfill the very 
purposes for which a federal reservation was created,’ and not where it 
is merely ‘valuable for a secondary use of the reservation.’”72 The court 
 
66 See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983). 
67 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 19.03[4]. See, e.g., Montana v. Confederated 
Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 767 (Mont. 1985) 
(interpreting Indian water rights the Montana court applied non-Indian water right case 
precedent and noted, “There are no special canons of construction for interpreting the 
documents that create federal reserved water rights. The purposes for which the federal 
government reserves land are strictly construed.”). 
68 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 19.03[4]. See, e.g., In re Big Horn River Sys. 
(Big Horn), 753 P.2d 76, 96−99 (Wyo. 1988); United States v. Washington (Lummi), 375 
F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1066 (W.D. Wash. 2005). See also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 
600 (1963). 
69 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 19.03[4]. 
70 See United States v. Washington (Lummi), 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 
71 United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1983). 
72 Id. at 1408−09. In United States v. Washington (Lummi), the court denied the Lummi 
Nation’s claims to water for purposes of grazing in addition to agriculture and domestic uses 
as part of the purpose of a homeland. 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (W.D. Wash. 2005). The court 
held the homeland theory must fail as a matter of law. Id. at 1065. The appropriate inquiry 
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acknowledged that New Mexico was not directly applicable to Winters 
rights, but that it served as a useful guideline.73 
While the New Mexico “guideline” may have resulted in a favorable 
water right award for the Klamath Tribe in Adair, it generally has not 
benefited other tribes. For example, in In re General Adjudication of 
All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System (Big Horn), the 
Wyoming Supreme Court limited the implied reservation of water for 
the Shoshone Reservation to irrigation only.74 Water for other 
purposes, such as fisheries, grazing, mining, wildlife and aesthetics, 
were not the “primary purposes” contemplated at the time of the treaty, 
concluded the court.75 
Similarly, in United States v. Washington (Lummi), a federal district 
court cited the rationale in Adair, New Mexico, and Cappaert to limit 
the Lummi Nation’s implied reservation of water to the very purpose 
for which the reservation was established.76 The Tribe urged the court 
to find a broad homeland purpose in the Treaty of Point Elliot in order 
to “support the evolving domestic, municipal and commercial needs of 
the Nation.”77 However, the court declined to do so and stated that such 
future use was not contemplated at the time the reservation was 
established.78 
Primary and secondary purposes analysis is now an inextricable 
feature of the federal reserved water right doctrine, but that need not 
cripple Winters rights. The problem for Winters rights is not that a 
reservation does not have a primary purpose. The problem is that 
rigidly interpreting a treaty so as to confine the purpose of an Indian 
reservation to primarily an agriculture strays too far from the inherent 
concept of Winters rights. 
As mentioned in Part II.B., describing Winters rights, treaties with 
tribes are to be construed liberally and resolve any ambiguities in favor 
of tribes as they would have understood the agreement at the time.79 It 
 
under federal law requires a primary purpose determination based on the intent of the federal 
government at the time the reservation was established. These implied Winters rights are 
necessarily limited in nature. Id. 
73 Adair, 723 F.2d at 1408. 
74 In re Big Horn River Sys. (Big Horn), 753 P.2d 76, 100 (Wyo. 1988). 
75 Id. at 98−99. 
76 Lummi, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 1064−66. 
77 Id. at 1065. 
78 Id. at 1066. 
79 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908). 
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is improbable to think that a tribe would have understood it was giving 
up its right to water for the future use of its people and only 
contemplated irrigating crops on their land.80 Such a rigid treaty 
interpretation is incompatible with the environmental realities of the 
many reservations in arid parts of the country.81 Rigid interpretation 
does not allow sovereign nations any flexibility in use of their water82 
or, in the words of the Winters Court, “the power to change.”83 
Furthermore, an Indian reservation should not be left valueless by a 
legal interpretation that allows state water practices to deprive them of 
full use of the water. State law may not adequately protect important 
“secondary” purposes of water. 
C. The Homeland Purpose for Indian Reservations 
Courts should return to the rationale behind Winters and make a 
principled determination that the purpose of an Indian reservation is to 
provide a homeland, so that the reservation is livable and valuable over 
the generations.84 
To determine the purpose of an Indian reservation, courts should 
employ the Indian canons of construction to liberally resolve any 
ambiguous treaty language in favor of tribes as they would have 
understood the agreement at the time.85 Doing so will generally result 
in a finding that the purpose of an Indian reservation is primarily to 
provide a permanent home, not solely to develop agriculture.86 Under 
 
80 See, e.g., In re Gila River Sys. & Source (Gila IV), 35 P.3d 68, 80 (Ariz. 2001). 
81 Id. at 78−79 (Ariz. 2001). 
82 It is true that once a tribe receives a quantified right, they can apply for a change in 
use. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419, 422 (1963). However, even that practice has been 
called into question based on the “primary purpose” of the reservation. See, e.g., In re Big 
Horn River Sys. (Big Horn II), 835 P.2d 273, 276, 278 (Wyo. 1992) (denying the Wind 
River Tribes’ attempt to transfer a portion of their quantified right for irrigation to instream 
flow). 
83 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). 
84 See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton (Walton II), 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), 
rev’d on other grounds 752 F.2d 397, 405 (9th Cir. 1985). While the Winters Court did not 
determine the purpose of the Ft. Belknap Indian Reservation, it noted the treaty was an 
agreement to become a “pastoral and civilized people.” Id. at 577; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 38−42. 
85 See Yakima v. Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (“When we are faced 
with . . . two possible constructions, our choice between them must be dictated by a principle 
deeply rooted in this Court’s Indian jurisprudence: ‘[S]tatutes are to be construed in favor 
of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.’”). 
86 See Walton II, 647 F.2d at 47 (“Providing for a land-based agrarian society, however, 
was not the only purpose for creating the reservation.”); Arizona v. California (Arizona II), 
460 U.S. 605, 616 (1983) (stating that implied in the establishment of the reservation is an 
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this concept, tribes’ federally reserved water is quantified by activities 
associated with a homeland, including agriculture, livestock, fisheries, 
municipal and industrial uses, and aesthetics.87 
In Walton II, the court interpreted an Executive Order establishing 
the Colville Reservation, which had not expressly provided for a 
particular purpose, and found that the “primary homeland” purpose of 
the reservation included both agriculture and traditional fisheries.88 In 
so finding, the court stated “the general purpose, to provide a home for 
the Indians, is a broad one and must be liberally construed.”89 
Congress’s “vision of progress implies a flexibility of purpose,”90 and 
a court should consider the tribe’s “need to maintain themselves under 
changed circumstances.”91 Therefore, the ultimate purpose of a Winters 
right, reasoned the court, is to make reservation land livable and 
valuable.92 
The Arizona Supreme Court was the first court to not only recognize 
a homeland purpose but to also employ a homeland standard as the 
method for quantifying Winters rights. In In re General Adjudication 
of all Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source (Gila 
IV),93 the court rejected an agricultural purpose and instead concluded 
the purpose of any Indian reservation is a homeland.94 The 
quantification analysis, therefore, should skip past any determination 
of purpose and instead focus on a reservation-by-reservation 
determination of the quantity needed for the reservation in question.95 
In quantifying the award, the court suggested looking to various 
factors, including the needs, wants, plans, cultural background, and 
geographic setting of the reservation.96 
 
allotment of water necessary to “make the reservation livable”); In re Gila River Sys. & 
Source (Gila IV), 35 P.3d 68, 76 (Ariz. 2001) (finding that the purpose of all Indian 
reservations is to “provide a permanent home and abiding place”) (quoting Winters v. United 
States, 207 U.S. 564, 564 (1908)). 
87 The United States asserted these activites as included in the purpose of the Wind River 
Reservation. See In re Big Horn River Sys. (Big Horn), 753 P.2d 76, 98−100 (Wyo. 1988). 
88 Walton II, 647 F.2d at 47−48. 
89 Id. at 47. 
90 Id. at 47 n.9. 
91 Id. at 47. 
92 Id. at 49−50. 
93 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001). 
94 Id. at 76, 78−79. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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Understanding an Indian reservation as having a homeland purpose 
helps release a court from constricted, agrarian-centric rulings. Such a 
liberal reading of treaties then frees courts to remember a tribe’s 
expectation of a water is to fulfill the needs of a reservation throughout 
time. This includes perhaps a tribe’s expectation that their water 
remains unimpaired in quality, in order to have their land remain 
livable and valuable. 
III 
THE PATH FOR WINTERS RIGHTS TO GROUNDWATER QUALITY 
This section explores the possible direction of Winters rights as it 
extends to groundwater and water quality of both surface water and 
groundwater. The first step is recognizing that a federal reserved water 
right to surface water likely applies to groundwater with the same logic. 
This appears to be a likely path for the doctrine as a whole and for 
Winters rights. The second step in exploring the fullness of the doctrine 
is to notice that water quality may actually be an inherent feature of the 
amount of water that is reserved in order to fulfill the purpose of a 
federal reservation. The final step to recognizing Winters rights to 
groundwater quality, is remembering that the purpose of an Indian 
reservation is to make it a livable and valuable homeland for current 
and future inhabitants; therefore, the quality of groundwater resources 
should necessarily be protected, especially when state water practices 
do not adequately protect them. 
A. First Step: Groundwater as a Logical Extension of Winters 
While the Supreme Court has not ruled that Winters extends to 
groundwater, it appears only a matter of time before the Court catches 
up with the growing legal and scientific consensus. As a recent 2010 
Ninth Circuit opinion stated, “[S]urface water contributes to 
groundwater and groundwater contributes to surface water. The 
reciprocal hydraulic connection between groundwater and surface 
water has been known to both the legal and professional communities 
for many years.”97 
The closest the Court came to recognizing a reserved right to 
groundwater was in its 1979 decision, Cappaert v. United States.98 
Cappaert involved an injunction restricting a rancher’s groundwater 
 
97 United States v. Orr Ditch Co., 600 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2010). 
98 United States v. Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128 (1976). 
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pumping to the extent necessary to preserve a rare species of pupfish 
in the national monument Devils Hole.99 In upholding the injunction, 
the Supreme Court declined to extend the federal reserved water rights 
doctrine to groundwater, reasoning that the water in Devils Hole was 
really just surface water.100 At the same time, however, the Court noted 
the association between surface water and groundwater were integral 
parts of the same hydrologic cycle.101 “[W]hether the diversion is of 
surface or groundwater” the Court held that the rancher could not pump 
water so as to impair the survival of the pupfish, the very purpose of 
the federal monument’s creation.102 
A growing number of courts have extended federal reserved rights 
to groundwater by understanding the sentiment behind Cappaert.103 
Even the Wyoming Supreme Court, acknowledged the “logic” of 
extending the Winters rights to groundwater but declined to be the first 
court to do so.104 Other state courts, like the Arizona Supreme Court, 
have been bolder105 and gathered assurances from the “guideposts” of 
Winters and Cappeart that Winters rights extends to groundwater.106 
 
99 Id. at 322. 
100 Id. at 142 (1976). The Ninth Circuit opinion on appeal expressly extended the federal 
reserved water rights doctrine to groundwater. United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313, 317 
(9th Cir. 1974) (“In our view, the United States may reserve not only surface water but also 
underground water.”) (relying in part on Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) and 
Arizona v. California (Arizona I), 373 U.S. 546,(1963)). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 143. 
103 See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton (Walton I), 460 F. Supp. 1320, 1326 (E.D. 
Wash. 1978), aff’d 647 F.2d 42) (“[Winters rights] extend to groundwater as well as surface 
water.”). (citing Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 142-43; Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F.Dupp. 383, 385 
(D. Mont. 1968)). (“. . . the same implications which led the . . . [Winters] Court to hold that 
surface waters had been reserved would apply to underground waters as well. The land was 
arid—water would make it more useful, and whether the waters were found on the surface 
of the land or under should make no difference.”); New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 
618 F. Supp. 993, 1010 (D.N.M. 1985) (citing Cappaert for the proposition that Pueblo 
water rights extend to groundwater as an integral part of the hydrological cycle). 
104 In re Big Horn River Sys. (Big Horn), 753 P.2d 76, 99−100 (Wyo. 1988), aff’d by an 
equally divided court, 492 U.S. 406 (1988) (“The logic which supports reservation of surface 
water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation also supports reservation of groundwater.”). 
105 In re Gila River Sys. & Source (Gila III) 989 P.2d 739, 745 (Ariz. 1999) (“We can 
appreciate the hesitation of the Big Horn court to break new ground, but we do not find its 
reasoning persuasive. That no previous court has come to grips with the issue does not 
relieve the present court, fairly confronted with the issue, of the obligation to do so.”). 
106 Id. at 747, 749 (“The significant question for the purpose of the reserved rights 
doctrine is not whether the water runs above or below the ground but whether [the water]is 
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.”). 
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The court’s conclusion is notable considering that two-thirds of the 
Arizona is federal land and such a ruling would impact state water users 
greatly.107 
With a growing number of courts ruling affirmatively on the matter, 
it seems more likely that a Winters right to groundwater can be upheld. 
Finding an implied reserved right to groundwater is one step closer to 
finding a right to groundwater quality, and fits squarely within the 
founding principles of the Winters doctrine. 
B. Second Step: Water Quality as an Attribute of Water Quantity for 
Winters Rights 
Water quality may actually be an attribute of the amount of water 
impliedly reserved in order to fulfill the purpose of a federal 
reservation. Awarding a water right for either surface water or 
groundwater need not be a set amount, but rather can be a flexible 
amount and account for the needs of the reservation. If state water users 
are over-drafting groundwater, or otherwise causing saltwater intrusion 
into a reserved groundwater right, then that right is diminished in 
quantity and quality and requires protection. 
1. Surface Water Quality 
Federal reserved water rights, as compared to state water rights, can 
have special considerations for water quality in calculating the quantity 
of the right. For state water rights, water quality is considered under 
state regulations with set standards,108 leaving the typical focus of a 
state water right to be decreed for a set amount. Federal reserved water 
rights, by contrast, may be able to fluctuate in the award amount 
because protecting purpose of the reservation is the most crucial 
consideration.109 As such, some courts have ordered flexible injunctive 
relief so as to protect certain attributes of water quality, like 
temperature, water level, or salinity, if it fulfills the purpose of a federal 
reservation of land.110 
 
107 Id. at 744. 
108 See RODGERS, supra note 8, § 4:17. 
109 See United States v. Gila Valley River District (Gila II), 920 F. Supp. 1444, 1447−48 
(D. Ariz 1994), aff’d 117 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128, 
141 (1976); United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Wash. 1982) aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 736 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1984). 
110 Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141; Anderson, 591 F. Supp. at 5. 
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For example, the Supreme Court in United States v. Cappaert111 
protected an amount of water necessary to protect the “scientific value” 
of waters in a national monument. 112 The Court affirmed an injunction 
restricting a rancher’s groundwater pumping to the extent necessary to 
ensure the survival of a rare pup fish in Devils Hole National 
Monument.113 The amount necessary to protect the pupfish did not 
mean the quality of the water could not be impacted at all.114 Rather, 
the Court ordered that “adequate levels” should be preserved by an 
“appropriately tailored” amount of water.115 
A federal district court in Washington held that Winters rights 
reserve the amount of water necessary to maintain an instream flow of 
a certain temperature.116 United States v. Anderson117 involved the 
Spokane Indian Reservation, created for the purpose of preserving the 
Tribe’s access to fishing on Chamokane Creek.118 Evidence showed 
that the creek must be maintained at sixty-eight degrees to allow the 
local fish population to thrive.119 Thus to keep the temperature of the 
creek down, and thereby protect the Spokane’s ability to fish, the court 
ordered the State to administer the creek with fluctuating diversion 
rates.120 By inference, fixed diversion rates would not appropriately 
regulate the temperature of the reservation’s water.121 
A federal district court in Arizona went so far as to expressly protect 
a tribe’s right to water quality from actual harm. In Gila II, the court 
protected, and the Ninth Circuit upheld, the quality of surface water 
reaching the San Carlos Apache Tribe Reservation.122 The Apache 
Tribe had traditionally used their decreed senior rights to irrigate a salt-
 
111 426 U.S. 128 (1976). 




116 Anderson, 591 F. Supp. at 5. 
117 591 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wash. 1982) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 736 F.2d 1358, 1361 
(9th Cir. 1984). 
118 Anderson, 591 F. Supp. at 5, 14. 
119 Id. at 5. 
120 Id. at 14. 
121 Id. at 14. 
122 United States v. Gila Valley River District (Gila II), 920 F. Supp. 1444, 1447−48 (D. 
Ariz 1994) aff’d 117 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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sensitive crop.123 Upstream farmers with junior water rights were over-
pumping groundwater and allegedly causing saltwater to seep into the 
river and salinized the river.124 The court held that the farming practices 
effectively deprived the Apache Tribe of their water right since the 
water quality affected crop viability to such a degree.125 The court held 
that injunctive relief to limit the groundwater pumping was 
warranted.126 
The above cases demonstrate that state water practices may be 
enjoined if they diminish the quality of surface water necessary to 
fulfill the purpose of a reservation. This is because the quality of 
surface water can be inherent to the amount of water necessary to fulfill 
the purpose of a reservation. Special protections may be required to 
guard against state practices that diminish water quality and defeat the 
purpose of a reservation. If the purpose of an Indian reservation is a 
homeland, certain protection for water quality may be required so as 
not to jeopardize the future of the inhabitants. 
2. Groundwater Quality 
While the body of law recognizing a federal reserved water right to 
groundwater quality is sparse, there may be an intriguing work-around. 
A court could protect a right to groundwater quality indirectly by 
decreeing a large quantity of groundwater. However, this would be 
more likely, and the award much larger, if courts recognize a homeland 
purpose for Indian reservations. 
In United States v. Washington (Lummi), the United States sought to 
exclude all uses of groundwater by non-Indians, particularly the 
withdrawal of too much water that would cause saltwater intrusion into 
an aquifer beneath the Lummi Reservation.127 This claim required the 
court to consider the quantity of groundwater that the Tribe was 
actually entitled to withdraw by examining the primary purpose of the 
 
123 Gila II, 920 F. Supp. at 1447−48, 50. The water right was a decreed right, and 
therefore there was no analysis of the purpose of the Reservation. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 1449−50 (the effect of groundwater pumping was “difficult to overstate”). 
126 Id. at 1453, 1455−56 (“the parties are in a better position to consider . . . measures of 
the realistic improvement of water quality in light of the Court’s findings and conclusions”). 
127 United States v. Washington (Lummi), 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1059 (W.D. Wash. 
2005) (vacated pursuant to settlement by United States v. Washington, 2007 WL 4190400 
(W.D. Wash. 2007)); see also Complaint, Lummi, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (No. C01-0047Z). 
The same court in a prior decision had recognized the Lummi Reservation held Winters 
rights to groundwater. See Lummi, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 1058. 
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Treaty of Point Elliot.128 The court declined to find a homeland purpose 
for the treaty, and so limited the groundwater award to agricultural 
purposes.129 Had the court not done so, a larger homeland award could 
have resulted in an amount large enough to protect the aquifer from all 
other uses. 
As Lummi shows, if a court holds that a reservation’s purpose is 
anything other than a homeland, this may decrease the possible award. 
However, the larger the groundwater award, the more possible it may 
be to exclude interference with the groundwater quality. 
C. Final Step: State Law May Not Adequately Protect Winters 
Rights in Groundwater 
States can be expected to push back on any assertion of an implied 
right to groundwater quality out of fear of unfettered allocations of 
Winters rights. State appropriators would likely argue that an implied 
right to groundwater quality would result in too large of an award, 
possibly the entire amount of water in an aquifer, and that Congress 
would have not intended such an outcome.130 Furthermore, any right to 
quality would be a secondary purpose and, therefore, should be 
governed by state law. Conceivably such regulations would adequately 
protect any federally reserved groundwater from possible impairments. 
However, the Winters principles are firm in that courts do not defer 
to state law, or the needs of state water users, when determining the 
scope of federal reserved water rights.131 As discussed above, federal 
law defines the scope and extent of federal reserved water rights. While 
 
128 Id. at 1058, 1059 (finding that the Treaty of Point Elliot “reserved for the present use 
and occupation” of the Lummi Nation the land and its resources). 
129 Id. at 1065−66. 
130 See, e.g., Lummi, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 1058. 
131 See Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 
(1976) (“the volume and scope of particular reserved rights . . . [remain] federal questions”) 
(quoting United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 526 (1971)); 
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 19.03[1], at 1211; Colville Confederated Tribes v. 
Walton (Walton I), 752 F.2d 397, 465 (9th Cir. 1985); but see In re Big Horn River Sys. 
(Big Horn), 753 P.2d 76, 111−12 (Wyo. 1988) (citing United States v. New Mexico, 438 
U.S. 696 (1978) for the sensitivity doctrine). 
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state regulations may equally protect for all groundwater users,132 
federal reserved water rights may require broader protections.133 
Furthermore, where state law is inadequate to protect a reserved 
right, or is in conflict with fulfilling the purpose of a federal 
reservation, more protective measures may be required. In In re 
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River (Gila 
III) the Supreme Court of Arizona134 held that the San Carlos Apache 
Tribe was entitled to protection from any off-reservation pumping that 
“significantly diminishes” the amount of water available to satisfy the 
purpose of their reservation.135 Arizona water code provisions afforded 
equal protection to all overlying landowner’s right to pump 
groundwater, including the Tribe.136 However, the court found that the 
codes did not prevent overconsumption of groundwater and therefore 
could not adequately protect federal rights.137 So as not to defeat the 
purpose of the reservation, the court declined to defer to state law and 
indicated that broader protections would be necessary to maintain 
sufficient water to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.138 The 
court clarified that this broader protection did not mean a requirement 
of “zero impact,” and relied on Cappaert to find that the protected 
amount should be “appropriately tailored to minimal need.”139 The 
court concluded it could not defer to state law where doing so would 
defeat the federal water rights. 
Protecting Winters right to groundwater quality does not mean there 
is a zero tolerance for impacts; some impact from state water practices 
is to be expected. However, such state water practices may not impair 
 
132 See RODGERS, supra note 8, § 4:17 Water quality standards—State law (judicial 
review) (2013). States often point to these water codes when defending adequate protection 
of groundwater. See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River 
(Gila III), 989 P.2d 739, 747−49 (Ariz. 1999). 
133 In re Gila River Sys. & Source (Gila III) 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999). 
134 Id. The Gila III court found the rationale the court in In re All Rights to Use Water in 
the Big Horn River System (Big Horn), 753  P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988) used to decline to rule on 
the issue “unpersuasive.” “That no previous court has come to grips with an issue does not 
relieve a present court, fairly confronted with the issue, of the obligation to do so.” Gila III, 
989 P.2d at 747. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 747−49. 
137 Id. at 750. Federal claimants receive the benefit of federal law when state and federal 
law conflict. Id. at 745 (citing Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 
545, 571 (1983)). 
138 Id. at 747, 750 (“We may not withhold application of the reserved rights doctrine 
purely out of deference to state law. Rather, we may not defer to state law where to do so 
would defeat federal water rights.”). 
139 Id. 
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a Winters right so as to defeat the purpose of a reservation. State law 
and sensitivities may not be a factor in whether or not those practices 
should be tolerated. 
CONCLUSION 
In the evolution of the federal reserved water rights doctrine, there 
are grounds for Indian tribes to secure quality groundwater for their 
community for future generations. To do so, courts must shake off the 
shackles of non-Indian case precedent requiring a narrow views of what 
the purpose of an Indian reservation can be. Courts must remember to 
that the door is still open to rely on the founding principles of Winters, 
and find that the purpose of an Indian reservation is to create a 
habitable, valuable homeland for present and future needs of a nation. 
Nations must be able to protect their water from state water practices, 
regardless of state interests, if those practices impair the groundwater 
quality necessary for that purpose of their Indian reservation. 
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